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1 Introduction
Concerns over climate change have motivated sustained efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. In the spirit of Arthur Pigou (Pigou, 1952), carbon taxation or pricing has
become the preferred tool of economists in reducing carbon emissions in an efficient manner
(Nordhaus, 1993). While the appropriate level of carbon price has been the subject of
some debate (most famously Stern and Stern (2007); Nordhaus (2007a,b)), the general
principle enjoys broad acceptance amongst the academic community1. Translating this
academic acceptance of carbon taxation to social acceptance is challenging (Carattini
et al., 2017).The distributional implications of carbon taxation are of concern (Kolstad
et al., 2014), with Farrell (2017) finding that carbon tax incidence is driven not only
by income but by other socioeconomic characteristics. The efficacy of carbon taxation
as a means of reducing emissions has also been questioned (Vasilakou, 2010; Patt and
Lilliestam, 2018), compounding the affordability and distributional concerns.
Using the revenues of carbon taxation to compensate households for the costs in-
curred by carbon taxation is often proposed as a mechanism of mitigating these and other
concerns, with Klenert et al. (2018a) providing a comprehensive summary of the range
of revenue recycling mechanisms available to policy-makers. Revenue recycling, when
correctly designed, can yield a “double dividend” of redistribution, especially if the tax
system before the reform is non-optimal (Klenert et al., 2018b). The “carbon cheque” and
other forms of lump sum transfers, where households receive an equal amount from the
additional tax revenues, have been recently advocated by Nobel laureate economist and
governments to increase public acceptability of carbon taxes. An improperly designed real-
location mechanism can potentially create more pressure on inequality than the tax itself.
However, the research on distributional effects of different revenue recycling mechanism is
narrow.
There is a large and growing literature on carbon taxation and so we restrict our at-
tention to Ireland. Ireland has made poor progress in reducing carbon emissions and is
projected to miss its carbon reduction targets by more than any other EU Member State
(European Commission, 2018). In response to this, the Irish Parliament recently produced
a report that advocated, amongst other measures, an increase in carbon taxation (Joint
Committee on Climate Action, 2019). A carbon tax was introduced in 2010 which applies
to non-ETS emissions and currently stands at e20 per tonne. Carbon pricing is thus envis-
aged as a core policy instrument to transit towards a sustainable economy (Department
of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, 2017). There have been several
studies performed in Ireland that use macro or computable general equilibrium models to
determine the impact of carbon taxation on emissions and on the whole economic activity
(see (Bergin et al., 2004; Wissema and Dellink, 2007; Conefrey et al., 2013; FitzGerald
and McCoy, 1992)). On the microeconomic side, non-behavioural-microsimulation mod-
els have been used to estimate the distributional effects of the introduction of a carbon
tax in Ireland (Scott and Eakins, 2004; Callan et al., 2009; Verde and Tol, 2009), taking
various revenue recycling mechanisms into account. These models are partial equilibrium
models and find that a carbon tax is regressive, but targeted revenue recycling can remove
the regressive effects. A major assumption of these papers is zero price elasticity, where
consumers do not reduce their consumption of carbon due to the tax increase. While this
may be a plausible assumption in the short-run, it is does not apply in the long run.
Thus, to date, any research on carbon taxation in Ireland that examined changes in
emissions in response to carbon taxation were in the macroeconomic/computable general
equilibrium space, while research that considered distributional effects assumed that car-
bon emissions did not reduce in response to the tax. This paper, in contrast to general
equilibrium models, considers microeconomic modelling that examines the distributional
implications of carbon taxation while estimating the quantities of various goods consumed
1https://www.econstatement.org/
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under an increase in taxation, and so captures any resulting changes in emissions. We do
so by estimating the recently proposed Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) demand system
(Lewbel and Pendakur, 2009) using microdata from the Irish Household Budget Survey
(HBS).
O’Donoghue (1997) is one of the few studies that uses a demand system approach with
Irish data to model behavioural changes and analyse distributional effects of increases of
energy taxes. While the use of demand systems in the economic literature to analyse this
issue is not new (see Baker et al. (1989); Labandeira and Labeaga (1999); Labandeira
et al. (2006); Bo¨hringer et al. (2017), few studies analyse changes of welfare at aggregate
level and inequality changes. In addition, existing literature assumes linear (see Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980)) or quadratic Engel curves (see Banks et al. (1997)). Engel curves
describe how household expenditure on a particular commodity changes across different
levels of income. We use the EASI demand system because it is the only available method-
ology that allows for flexible representation of Engel curves. Demand systems have been
used to study households’ energy use and carbon emissions (Creedy and Sleeman, 2006;
Pashardes et al., 2014; Tovar Rean˜os and Wo¨lfing, 2018), but, to our knowledge, this is
the first study employing the EASI demand system to investigate the distributional ef-
fects of carbon taxes. The model is extended to evaluate welfare changes at individual
and aggregate levels caused by increases in energy prices via carbon taxation.
This paper examines the implications of several carbon taxation and revenue recycling
mechanisms from both a distributional and an environmental point of view using Irish
microdata. The original contributions of this paper are the use of the EASI demand system
to estimate the impacts of carbon taxation, as well as the examination of the distributional
implications of carbon taxation and revenue recycling in Ireland via microsimulation, while
taking into account these behavioural changes induced by the tax. The results indicate
that carbon taxation is an effective measure of reducing carbon emissions, with carbon tax
increases of e30 and e80 being associated with emission reductions of 3.94% and 10.24%
respectively. The tax is regressive, as measured by equivalent variation as opposed to
flat allocation, but recycling carbon taxation revenues to households can mitigate these
regressive effects, even with a relatively crude recycling mechanism of an equal lump
sum payment per household. A more sophisticated recycling mechanism that targets the
revenues to lower income households renders the total policy package progressive, reducing
rather than increasing inequality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the methodology
of the EASI demand system and the derived measures, first outlined in Tovar Rean˜os and
Wo¨lfing (2018). Section 3 presents the data and estimation results. Section 4 outlines the
data and revenue recycling scenarios employed while section 5 illustrates the potential of
our model for microsimulation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 The Affine Stone Index (EASI) implicit Marshallian demand system
The methodology employed here is similar to that of Tovar Rean˜os and Wo¨lfing (2018)
where after estimating the EASI demand system from microdata, changes in welfare at
household and aggregated level are estimated. The EASI (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2009) is
the latest major advancement in the literature on household demand systems. It provides
a first-order approximation of an arbitrary expenditure function from which a demand
system can be derived. The estimated expenditure function must have all the properties
that hold for a theoretical expenditure function (Varian, 1992). In order to estimate
the EASI, only information on the expenditure for different goods and their prices are
required. Unlike the Almost Ideal Demand System and its variations, the EASI demand
system can represent the relationship between expenditure and income, the Engels curves,
in a flexible manner. The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator or an iterated
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linear approximation can be used to estimate the demand system. Lewbel and Pendakur
propose the following expenditure function:
log [C(p, y)] = y +
I∑
i=1
mi(y,z) log(pi)
+
1
2
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
aij log(pi) log(pj)
+
1
2
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
bij log(pi)y
+
I∑
i=1
εi log(pi)
(1)
where
mi =
R∑
r=0
br log(y)
r +
∑
l
dilzl log(y) +
∑
l
gilzl (2)
and where pi are commodity prices, y is the implicit household utility, and zl are
demographic characteristics. R is chosen by the modeller and determines the degree of
the polynomial mi. This specification allows for highly flexible Engel curves while still
keeping the functional form quite comprehensible. ai,j,l, bi,j , bi,r, di,l and gil are the
parameters to be estimated. i represent unobserved preference heterogeneity. Lewbel
and Pendakur show that the implicit utility, y, can be expressed in the following way:
y =
log(x)−∑iwi log(pi) + 12∑i∑j ai,j log(pi) log(pi)
1− 12
∑
i
∑
j bi,j log(pi) log(pj)
(3)
By applying Shephard’s lemma to the cost function embedded in expression (1)2, the
following set of equations for the budget shares wi is obtained:
wi =
∑
j
ai,j log pj +
∑
j
bi,j log y
+
R∑
r=0
bi,r[log y]
r +
∑
l
gi,lzl +
∑
l
di,lzl log y + i.
(4)
Lewbel and Pendakur shows that (4) can be estimated with an approximation of y or
with (3), with very similar estimates3. We use the first approach where approximating y
reduces the computational burden of estimating the parameters of the system and stan-
dard errors using three-stage least squares (3SLS). The following restrictions ensure the
theoretical consistence of the estimated expenditure function:
2Note that log(x) = log [C(p, y)]
3The authors approximate y by using log(x)−∑i w¯ilog(pi) where w¯i is the mean of the budget share.
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ai,j,l = aj,i,l and
∑
i
ai,j,l = 0 ∀ l,
bi,j = bj,i and
∑
i
bi,j = 0,∑
i
di,l =
∑
i
gi,l = 0 ∀ l,∑
i
bi,r = 0 for r 6= 0,∑
i
bi,r = 1 for r = 0,
(5)
We use information on intra-group variation of the aggregated consumption categories
to obtain household-specific prices following Lewbel (1989) to further improve identifica-
tion. Once the parameters in equation 4 are estimated, own-price elasticities (OPE) and
expenditure elasticities (EE) can be computed as follows:
OPE =
{
∂wi
∂ log(pi)
}
1
wi
− 1 (6)
EE =
{
∂wi
∂ log(X)
}
1
wi
+ 1 (7)
We can describe the impacts of changes in welfare by estimating Hicks’s equivalent
variation (HEV). HEV = C(p0, U1)−C(p0, U0), where U is the level of household utility.
This follows Creedy and Sleeman (2006) and Tovar Rean˜os and Wo¨lfing (2018).
2.2 Inequality and social welfare
“Equivalent income” (xe) is defined by King (1983) as y(p1, xe) = y(p0, x0) where y is the
indirect utility as expressed in (3). “Equivalent income” (xe) is the income level required in
order to achieve the utility that prevails under the current income level, but at a different
set of prices.4 Tovar Rean˜os and Wo¨lfing (2018) shows that (xe) can be estimated as
xe = x −HEV . From this, we define a metric that aggregates changes in social welfare
arising from changes in equivalent income and inequality, weighted by society’s (or a Social
Planner’s) aversion to same, as follows:
Social Welfare =
∑H
h=1
(
xe ∗ √hsizeh
)∑H
h=1 hsizeh︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean equivalent income (MEI)
×(1−A), (8)
where A is Atkinson’s inequality index,  is the inequality aversion parameter (from
the perspective of a social planner), “hsize” is the number of people in the household,
and H is the total number of households in our sample. This metric measures aggregate
changes in social welfare.
The inequality aversion parameter is set at  = 1.25.
4Note that this definition is distinct from an unrelated definition of ‘equivalent income’ that appears
elsewhere in the economic literature, namely that of a measure of income by a household member that
accounts for household composition and economies of scale.
5Creedy and Sleeman (2006) choose  = 0.2 and  = 1.2. Our choice of  seems to be a reasonable
upper bound for this parameter, although we note here that Pirttila¨ and Uusitalo (2010) suggest that
under certain circumstances, even higher values of  may prove appropriate. We perform sensitivities on
the choice of inequality aversion parameter in Appendix II.
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3 Data and estimation
3.1 Household data, price data and commodity grouping
The dataset employed in this work is the Household Budget Survey (HBS), conducted
by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) every five years. The purpose of the survey is to
determine a detailed pattern of household expenditure, which in turn is used to update
the weighting basis of the Consumer Price Index6. We use the waves from 1994, 1999,
2004, 2009 and 2015-2016 in this work, in a pooled cross-sectional manner. We also use
indices for commodity prices for the same years provided by the CSO.
For the purposes of this study, the consumption goods were grouped into several cate-
gories: foods, housing, lighting and heating (which we also term “energy” throughout the
course of this paper), transportation, education and leisure, and other goods and services.
This aggregation is similar to that used in Tovar Rean˜os and Wo¨lfing (2018) and Bo¨hringer
et al. (2017). This grouping largely follows the Classification of Individual Consumption
According to Purpose (COICOP). As in Baker et al. (1989), we do not include the pur-
chase of vehicles and white goods appliances. Instead, dummy variables for ownership of
these goods are included in the analysis. The rationale for this is that the EASI demand
system does not accommodate some aspects of intertemporal demand decisions, and so
we ignore durable goods.
Summary statistics for the full dataset are shown in Table 1. In addition, dummy
variables are included for whether a dwelling is in a rural area (according to the CSO
classification of same), the age of the dwelling, whether the dwelling has gas fired central
heating, a washing machine, a dishwasher and a fridge, and finally whether the household
owns a car7. Dummy variables are also included for the year and quarter in which the
data were collected.
Energy expenditure comprises expenditure on electricity, natural gas, liquid fuels and
solid fuels. Transportation expenditure comprises petrol, diesel, maintenance, insurance
and public transport. Carbon taxes in the non-ETS sector affect the prices of heating
fuels and of fuels for private transportation, and so we can estimate the changes in the
expenditure distribution as a result of the carbon tax’s effect on both groups. Pricing
data was obtained from the price index from the CSO. Given that this is a price index,
we do not have actual prices in monetary values. However, the precise evolution of prices
for the goods categories observed in the expenditure data is sufficient to identify the EASI
demand system.
Figures 1 to 3 graph the budget shares of expenditure for heating and lighting and
diesel and petrol by expenditure quartile, along with the CO2 emissions by quartile. The
fact that expenditure shares on energy commodities is largest for the poorest households
may confirm that carbon taxation is regressive, which tallies with previous research for
Ireland and elsewhere. Richer households have higher emissions, however, which calls
for the implementation of a progressive policy instrument that sees emissions taxation
increasing with income. These observations motivate the current research.
6See https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/housingandhouseholds/householdbudgetsurvey/
7A robustness check on the impact of car ownership is performed in Appendix III.
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Figure 1: Budget share of heating and lighting expenditure by quartiles.
Figure 2: Budget share of transport expenditure by quartiles.
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Figure 3: Emissions by quartile
3.2 Estimation
Figure 4 displays non-parametric kernel regressions of budget shares for each of the
commodity groupings over the log of total household consumption. Even for this non-
parametric regression, each of these curves are nonlinear. This indicates that a traditional
Almost Ideal or Quadratic Almost Ideal demand system, which have been applied to Irish
HBS data previously (most recently Savage (2016)), would not appropriately capture the
budget effects for some commodity groups.
Turning to the EASI estimates, we find statistically significant and greater than zero
parameters for the polynomials of up to degree six (see Table 2). This confirms the
nonlinearity of the Engel curves and justifies the approach taken in this paper.
We also perform two robustness checks on the above model, one where we restrict our
attention to households that own cars and a second where we exclude variables relating to
the ownership of white goods. The results of these robustness checks appear in Appendix
III and are discussed in the microsimulation section below.
3.3 Elasticities
Table 3 shows the own price and expenditure elasticities for each commodity group. The
expenditure elasticity of energy is lowest of all commodity groups, which is a natural
consequence of the fact that energy is (a) a necessary good and (b) has few substitutes.
Transport’s own price elasticity is second lowest, for similar reasons.
Tables 4 and 5 show the elasticities for households in the lowest and highest expenditure
quartiles, respectively. Higher expenditure households have higher own price elasticities
for both energy and transport, relative to lower expenditure households. This is most
likely also due to the limited substitution possibilities of energy, and can be regarded as
an example of what Angus Deaton called Pigou’s Law (Deaton, 1974), which states that
price elasticities of demand are proportional with income. These elasticities partly drive
the regressive nature of energy taxation, even when behavioural responses are taken into
account. Table 6 shows the cross-price elasticities for each of the commodity groups.
Direct comparison of our estimated elasticities with estimates in the literature is not
possible because this is the first attempt to measure them using the EASI demand system.
The few existing estimates for Ireland use a different aggregation approach. Nonetheless,
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Figure 4: Non-parametric Engel curves: Expenditure share of commodities over monthly
non-durable expenditure in thousand Euros, log scaled.
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our estimated own price elasticities (OPE) for lighting and heating and transport are
in line with estimates found in the literature. Pothen and Tovar Rean˜os (2018) found
similar estimates for these metrics for Germany. While Savage (2016) included lighting
and heating and transport in only one category, his estimates are not far away from our
estimated OPE. Salotti et al. (2015) use a simplified AIDS model to compute expenditure
elasticities for six different European countries and find heating fuel elasticities of between
0.12 and 0.47; the weighted average is 0.26, which compares well with our results of
0.211. In terms of transport, a wide range exists in the literature: the weighted average
of exenditure elasticities found by Salotti et al. is 0.47, while Clements et al. (2006)
study expenditure elasticities for 45 different OECD countries and report their average
expenditure elasticity for transport as 1.58. Our estimate of 0.733 is within these two
estimates. Our results are therefore within the bounds found in the extant literature, and
any discrepancies may be explained at least in part by the fact that the EASI is more
flexible and better able to accommodate non-linear Engel curves, as discussed above.
Regarding the rest of the commodity groups, our estimates for food are larger than
those estimated by Savage (2016). He estimates OPE for food, tobacco and alcohol, while
we follow the COICOP classification where alcohol, tobacco and dining out are included
in the “food” category. This may account for the relatively high own price elasticity seen
for this commodity group in our results8.
4 Microsimulation data and scenarios
The demand system estimated above is now used to simulate the effect of carbon taxation
on expenditure on the various commodity groups. For the purposes of the microsimulation,
we use the 2015-2016 wave of the HBS as it has the most recent data available. The
emissions factors and the fuel prices (in e/ kW) of the energy commodities were obtained
from the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland9. Direct emissions only are considered.
Furthermore, as this is a partial equilibrium model, changes in the supply of labour or
commodities are not captured by the analysis. This shall be the focus of future research.
We consider two scenarios, which correspond to an increase in carbon taxation of e30
per tonne and e80 per tonne. These correspond to a total carbon tax of e50 per tonne
and e100 per tonne, respectively. In the base case scenario, households face the existing
carbon tax of e20 per tonne.
In addition, we consider two alternative mechanisms for allocating the revenue raised
by the carbon taxation measure to households. Under the flat allocation scenario, every
household receives an equal direct transfer, the magnitude of which is such that the total
carbon tax revenue raised is exhausted. In the targeted allocation scenario, 50% of the
revenue is recycled to houses in the same manner as the flat allocation. The remaining 50%
is recycled to the two lower expenditure quartiles, in inverse proportion to the household’s
share of aggregate expenditure, according to equations (9) and (10):∑H
h Xh
Xh
= rh (9)
shareh =
rh∑
h rh
(10)
where Xh is the total expenditure of each household h and shareh is the share of the
total carbon taxation revenues that accrues to household h. Equation (9) calculates the
inverse of the proportion of total expenditure accounted for by each household h. Equation
(10) normalises this metric in order to ensure that the sum of the shares of the revenue
received by each household is one.
8Cross price elasticities are also provided in appendix I.
9See https://www.seai.ie/resources/publications/Energy-Emissions-2017-Final.pdf
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In our results that omit revenue recycling, we essentially assume that the revenue is
not used for any purpose and plays no role in public expenditure or taxation. While this
is an unrealistic assumption, it is not possible to model all possible alternative uses for
the carbon taxation revenue.
5 Microsimulation results
5.1 Initial incidence: household level
The tax paid by each household assuming no change in behaviour is shown in Tables 7
and 8 for a tax increase of e30 and e80, respectively. The regressive nature of the tax is
clear, with the burden decreasing as total expenditure rises, for all households types.
Tables 9 and 10 consider Hick’s equivalent variation for the different household types
and quartiles, and so include the behavioural element of carbon emission reduction. The
cost of the policy again decreases as expenditure increases, although the difference between
the lowest and highest quartile is slightly lower than the tax burden with no behavioural
response. The greatest cost is bourne by single households with children.
While the behavioural estimates displayed in Tables 9 and 10 show smaller estimates
of welfare changes than the non-behavioural estimates in Tables 7 and 8, both approaches
agree on the regressive nature of the policy. Banks et al. (1996) show that neglecting
the effects of own and cross price elasticities when estimating welfare changes, as in the
non-behavioural approach, can introduce considerable bias in the estimation of welfare
changes. In addition, our approach allows us to estimate changes in emissions and in
aggregate changes in welfare and inequality using metrics that are coherent with economic
theory.
In the analysis above, expenditure on private and public transportation was included
together in the “transport” category, with a dummy variable accounting for car ownership.
In practice, expenditure on private transportation is likely to prove more responsive to
changes in fuel prices than expenditure on private transportation. In order to account
for this, and to test the robustness of the model, we perform a check in which we restrict
our analysis to the subset of the population that owns cars. The parameters from the
EASI model and the distributional analysis can be found in Table 16 in Appendix III. The
estimates for the equivalent variation in the absence of revenue recycling are presented in
Tables 17 and 18. Comparing these results to those in Tables 9 and 10, the same patterns
hold and the results are broadly similar. The regressive nature of the tax is again present.
The aggregate effect is seen in Table 19, which again compares well with Table 11.
As a further robustness check we run the model excluding the dummy variables that
account for ownership of vehicles and durable goods. The results are broadly similar, which
suggests that these dummy variables are not driving the results and that instead the EASI
demand system results are being driven by the expenditure shares and commodity prices
themselves. Table 20 in Appendix III shows the full results of the model.
5.2 Initial incidence: Aggregate level
Table 11 shows the changes in the Atkinson index of inequality and in the equivalent income
as the carbon tax increases. The changes in social welfare, as calculated by equation (8),
are also shown. The regressive nature of the tax is again apparent, with inequality, as
measured by the Atkinson Index, increasing. In addition, households see a reduction in
their level of expenditure of 0.46% and 1.14% for carbon tax increases of e30 and e80
per tonne, respectively. Social Welfare is reduced by 0.57% and 1.34% for the two tax
increases. In order to test the sensitivity of this result to the inequality aversion included
in equation (8), we perform sensitivities on this value; the results are reported in Tables
14 and 15. The impact on Social Welfare from varying this parameter is not particularly
pronounced, suggesting that the changes to Social Welfare are primarily driven by changes
10
to equivalent expenditure rather than inequality aversion on behalf of the social planner.
Table 14 also shows the changes in aggregate carbon emissions for the two tax increases.
A tax increase of e30 reduces emissions by 3.94%, while a tax increase of e80 decreases
emissions by 10.24%.
5.3 Impact of revenue recycling
We now present the results of returning the carbon taxation revenues to households via a
revenue recycling mechanism.
The impacts of revenue recycling at aggregate level are presented in Tables 12 and 13.
Both the flat and the targeted allocation reduce inequality (relative to the base case of the
existing e20 carbon tax with no revenue recycling), as measured by the Atkinson index.
However, the reduction is more pronounced under the targeted allocation. Furthermore,
Social Welfare is increased under both scenarios, but particularly under the targeted allo-
cation. The results suggest that combining carbon taxation with an appropriate revenue
recycling mechanism can not only allay any concerns surrounding the regressive nature
of carbon taxation, but that the policy can actually be net progressive, and may prove a
useful tool for policy makers seeking to increase the distributive element of a given tax
and welfare system.
The costs of the recycling mechanism have not been included here. However, the
administration cost of the flat allocation mechanism is likely to be higher, as it entails
facilitating a direct cash transfer to each household. The targeted mechanism, however,
could be achieved by adjusting the existing taxation and welfare system, which should
prove less onerous.
The targeted mechanism outlined here is necessarily crude due to a paucity of income
data in the HBS. The general applicability of this research is however enhanced by this.
6 Conclusion
This paper used Irish microdata to estimate an EASI demand system which was in turn
used to calculate the impact at household level of an increase in non-ETS carbon taxa-
tion. The behavioural response of consumers to carbon taxation was therefore captured.
Emissions reduce by 3.94% in response to a carbon tax increase of e30 per tonne, while
an increase of e80 per tonne reduces emissions by 10.24%.
The increase in carbon taxation is regressive, as energy expenditure makes up a greater
proportion of the total expenditure of poorer households (relative to richer households).
However, recycling the carbon taxation revenues mitigates this effect. A flat allocation,
where the carbon tax revenue is divided equally amongst all households, yields a small
decrease in inequality (as measured by the Atkinson Index) and a subsequent increase in
Social Welfare. A targeted allocation, that directs more of the revenue towards poorer
households, has more pronounced effects. The results indicate that a carbon tax coupled
with appropriate revenue recycling can achieve two separate policy goals that are often
thought to be mutually exclusive; namely those of decreasing both carbon emissions and
income inequality.
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Appendix I: Results tables
Estimation results
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Budget shares:
Food 0.246 0.128 23456
Housing 0.157 0.141 23456
Energy 0.056 0.049 23456
Transport 0.102 0.075 23456
Education 0.148 0.174 23456
Services 0.292 0.167 23456
Prices (logs):
Food 4.193 0.289 23456
Housing 3.225 0.533 23456
Energy 3.723 0.432 23455
Transport 3.524 0.565 23456
Education 3.445 0.908 23456
Services 2.832 0.885 23456
Total expenditure 841.5 688.7 23456
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Table 2: EASI demand system; linear 3 Stage Least Squares estimation, estimated from
equation (4). Estimated from equation (4). Estimates rounded to 3 digits
Regressor: Dependent variable: budget share for ...
Food Housing Energy Transport Education
Polynomial coefficient:
y1 0.949*** -0.099 0.358*** 0.511** -1.774***
y2 -0.670** 0.140 -0.293*** -0.599*** 1.774***
y3 0.231* -0.056 0.100** 0.291*** -0.876***
y4 -0.044 0.009 -0.017* -0.071*** 0.230***
y5 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.009*** -0.030***
y6 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.002***
Household types:
z1 -0.107*** -0.009 -0.013*** -0.019*** 0.053***
z2 -0.110*** -0.056*** 0.008** 0.014* -0.023
z3 -0.058*** 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.091***
z4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z5 -0.020** -0.081*** 0.003 -0.002 0.021*
z6 -0.006 -0.051*** -0.003 0.001 0.031***
Interaction term:
yz1 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.002 0.007*** -0.004
yz2 0.014*** -0.002 -0.002* -0.008*** 0.033***
yz3 0.009** 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.022***
yz4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
yz5 0.004 0.013*** -0.001 0.001 0.002
yz6 0.011*** 0.004 0.001 0.006*** -0.008**
Interaction between price and expenditure (bi,j):
ynp1 -0.033*** -0.002 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.015***
ynp2 -0.002 0.001 0.004*** 0.002* -0.000
ynp3 0.008*** 0.004*** -0.027*** 0.006*** 0.003***
ynp4 0.011*** 0.002* 0.006*** -0.026*** 0.006***
ynp5 0.015*** -0.000 0.003*** 0.006*** -0.051***
Price parameter (ai,j,l)
a1,j,l 0.130*** -0.004 -0.024*** -0.035*** -0.049***
a2,j,l -0.004 0.031*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.004
a3,j,l -0.024*** -0.022*** 0.115*** -0.024*** -0.018***
a4,j,l -0.035*** -0.021*** -0.024*** 0.118*** -0.025***
a5,j,l -0.049*** -0.004 -0.018*** -0.025*** 0.145***
constant -0.110 0.226 -0.033 0.059 0.702***
N 23455
R-squared 0.416 0.260 0.491 0.271 0.399
adjusted R2 220
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Elasticities
Table 3: Uncompensated own price and expenditure elasticities for all households
Elasticity: Food Housing Energy Transport Education Services
Own Price -1.012*** -0.961*** -0.426*** -0.706*** -1.312*** -1.368***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017)
Expenditure 0.537*** 0.990*** 0.211*** 0.733*** 1.834*** 1.253***
(0.012) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.030) (0.020)
Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 4: Uncompensated own price and expenditure elasticities for lowest quartile house-
holds
Elasticity: Food Housing Energy Transport Education Services
Own Price -1.053*** -0.946*** -0.441*** -0.474*** -0.648*** -1.188***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.021)
Expenditure 0.734*** 1.397*** 0.303*** 0.482*** 1.936*** 1.378***
(0.018) (0.055) (0.022) (0.035) (0.095) (0.024)
Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 5: Uncompensated own price and expenditure elasticities for highest quartile house-
holds
Elasticity: Food Housing Energy Transport Education Services
Own Price -1.070*** -0.907*** -0.630*** -0.856*** -1.620*** -1.463***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.039) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014)
Expenditure 0.415*** 0.801*** 0.313*** 0.474*** 1.780*** 1.107***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.049) (0.027) (0.024) (0.016)
Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 6: Own- and cross-price elasticities for all households
Food Housing Energy Transport Education Other
Food -1.012 -0.173 -0.130 -0.140 -0.152 -0.181
Housing -0.225 -0.961 -0.219 -0.253 -0.188 -0.133
Energy -0.007 -0.170 -0.426 -0.112 -0.140 -0.219
Transport -0.096 -0.218 -0.132 -0.706 -0.137 -0.173
Education -0.290 -0.283 -0.307 -0.299 -1.312 -0.030
Other -0.405 -0.346 -0.404 -0.398 -0.257 -1.368
All entries are statistically significant at the 1% level with the exception of Food-Energy
(which has a standard error of 0.0123).
Distributional impacts of carbon taxation at household level
Table 7: Carbon tax burden as a (%) of total expenditure (increase of e30 per tonne)
with no behavioural response
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Single no children 0.866 0.544 0.400 0.221
Single +65 1.138 0.708 0.446 0.332
2 adults no children 0.703 0.625 0.496 0.456
2 adults with children 0.734 0.691 0.563 0.441
Single with children 1.138 0.838 0.623 0.464
All households 0.986 0.702 0.578 0.465
Table 8: Carbon tax burden as a (%) of total expenditure (increase of e80 per tonne)
with no behavioural response
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Single no children 2.309 1.451 1.066 0.589
Single +65 3.034 1.888 1.188 0.885
2 adults no children 1.875 1.667 1.324 1.216
2 adults with children 1.958 1.842 1.502 1.177
Single with children 3.034 2.234 1.662 1.237
All households 2.629 1.871 1.541 1.239
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Table 9: Hick’s equivalent variation estimates for carbon tax increase of e30 as a (%) of
total expenditure
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Single no children -0.834 -0.412*** -0.342*** -0.228***
Single +65 -0.941 -0.576 -0.415 -0.164***
2 adults no children -0.767*** -0.575 -0.448 -0.477
2 adults with children -0.770 -0.643 -0.465** -0.372
Single with children -1.006 -0.668*** -0.453** -0.371
All households -0.879 -0.590** -0.478 -0.395*
Statistically signicant with respect to the sample mean in each quartile *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 10: Hick’s equivalent variation estimates for carbon tax increase of e80 as a (%) of
total expenditure
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Single no children -2.052 -1.027*** -0.857*** -0.569***
Single +65 -2.282 -1.406 -1.025 -0.471**
2 adults no children -1.878 -1.407 -1.104 -1.170
2 adults with children -1.874 -1.598** -1.152 -0.916
Single with children -2.470*** -1.643** -1.109 -0.924
All households -2.151* -1.456 -1.184 -0.975
Statistically signicant with respect to the sample mean in each quartile *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Distributional impacts at aggregate level
Table 11: Social Welfare for different carbon tax levels, initial incidence (Inequality aver-
sion: 1.2)
Tax AI % ∆ AI EI % ∆ EI SW % ∆ SW CO2 reduction
(e/tonne)
+30 0.16 0.40 562.40 -0.46 469.61 -0.54 3.94%
+80 0.17 1.04 558.59 -1.14 465.85 -1.34 10.24%
AI: Atkinson’s Index, EI: Equivalent income, SW: Social Welfare
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Table 12: Social Welfare with flat reallocation of revenues (Inequality aversion: 1.2)
Tax AI % ∆ AI EI % ∆ EI SW % ∆ SW
(e/tonne)
+30 0.16 -0.46 565.93 0.16 473.36 0.25
+80 0.16 -1.05 567.32 0.41 475.08 0.62
Table 13: Social Welfare with targeted reallocation of revenues (Inequality aversion: 1.2)
Tax AI % ∆ AI EI % ∆ EI SW % ∆ SW
(e/ tonne)
+30 0.16 -1.62 566.55 0.27 474.97 0.59
+80 0.16 -3.62 568.83 0.68 478.75 1.39
Appendix II:
Sensitivity results on the choice of the inequality aversion parameter
Table 14: Social Welfare for different carbon tax levels, initial incidence (Inequity aversion:
0.2)
Tax AI % ∆ AI EI % ∆ EI SW % ∆ SW
(e/tonne)
+30 0.03 0.43 562.40 -0.46 545.23 -0.48
+80 0.03 1.11 558.59 -1.14 541.42 -1.17
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Table 15: Social Welfare for different carbon tax levels, initial incidence (Inequity aversion:
2.2)
Tax AI % ∆ AI EI % ∆ EI SW % ∆ SW
(e/tonne)
+30 0.28 0.36 562.40 -0.46 406.70 -0.60
+80 0.28 0.94 558.59 -1.14 403.06 -1.49
Appendix III: Results from the robustness checks
Robustness check I: car ownership
Table 16: EASI implicit Marshallian demand system; linear 3 Stage Least Squares esti-
mation, estimates rounded to 3 digits. Estimated from equation (4). Dataset restricted
to households that own cars. Bootstrap tandard errors in parentheses.
Regressor: Dependent variable: budget share for ...
Food Housing Energy Transport Education
Polynomial coefficient:
y1 1.812 -0.204 0.236 0.216 -2.416
(0.525) (0.397) (0.110) (0.209) (0.931)
y2 -1.422 0.239 -0.198 -0.350 2.303
(0.432) (0.351) (0.094) (0.182) (0.837)
y3 0.573 -0.102 0.065 0.176 -1.110
(0.181) (0.156) (0.040) (0.080) (0.383)
y4 -0.127 0.021 -0.011 -0.043 0.285
(0.041) (0.037) (0.009) (0.019) (0.095)
y5 0.015 -0.002 0.001 0.005 -0.037
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.012)
y6 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Household types:
z1 -0.136 -0.052 -0.011 -0.017 0.054
(0.011) (0.016) (0.005) (0.008) (0.020)
z2 -0.132 -0.060 -0.002 -0.023 -0.025
(0.013) (0.019) (0.005) (0.008) (0.029)
z3 -0.087 0.016 -0.005 -0.007 0.105
(0.014) (0.020) (0.005) (0.010) (0.030)
z5 -0.036 -0.097 0.002 -0.006 0.038
(0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006) (0.016)
z6 -0.014 -0.058 -0.003 0.001 0.035
(0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.006) (0.016)
Interaction term:
yz1 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.006 -0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
yz2 0.019 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.040
(0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012)
yz3 0.018 -0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.025
(0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.011)
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yz5 0.008 0.017 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
yz6 0.013 0.005 0.001 0.006 -0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Interaction between price and expenditure (bi,j):
ynp1 -0.035 -0.001 0.006 0.015 0.015
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ynp2 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ynp3 0.006 0.004 -0.025 0.006 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ynp4 0.015 0.002 0.006 -0.034 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ynp5 0.015 0.002 0.004 0.008 -0.057
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Price parameter (ai,j,l)
a1,j,l 0.131 -0.009 -0.019 -0.050 -0.049
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
a2,j,l -0.009 0.043 -0.021 -0.022 -0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
a3,j,l -0.019 -0.021 0.108 -0.023 -0.018
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
a4,j,l -0.050 -0.022 -0.023 0.147 -0.030
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
a5,j,l -0.049 -0.011 -0.018 -0.030 0.166
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Heckman correction term 0.088 0.028 0.007 -0.028 -0.052
0.008 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.009
Cons -0.604 0.238 0.018 0.256 1.076
(0.253) (0.177) (0.051) (0.095) (0.415)
N 19862
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Table 17: Hick’s equivalent variation estimates for carbon tax of e50 for car owners only
as a (%) of total expenditure
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Single no children -0.768 -0.405 -0.284 -0.245
Single +65 -0.934 -0.574 -0.389 -0.229
2 adults no children -0.959 -0.487 -0.412 -0.471
2 adults with children -0.668 -0.639 -0.426 -0.360
Single with children -0.920 -0.572 -0.405 -0.362
All households -0.836 -0.576 -0.459 -0.381
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Table 18: Hick’s equivalent variation estimates for carbon tax of e100 for car owners only
as a (%) of total expenditure
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Single no children -1.897 -1.000 -0.702 -0.610
Single +65 -2.279 -1.394 -0.961 -0.558
2 adults no children -2.338 -1.213 -1.020 -1.150
2 adults with children -1.651 -1.594 -1.056 -0.886
Single with children -2.257 -1.406 -0.992 -0.891
All households -2.052 -1.424 -1.132 -0.938
Table 19: Social Welfare for different policies for car owners only (Inequity aversion: 1.2)
Tax AI % ∆ AI EI % ∆ EI SW % ∆ SW
(e/tonne)
+30 0.16 0.39 568.20 -0.45 476.33 -0.53
+80 0.16 1.01 564.44 -1.11 472.62 -1.30
Robustness check II: exclusion of various control variables
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Table 20: EASI implicit Marshallian demand system; linear 3 Stage Least Squares esti-
mation, estimates rounded to 3 digits. Estimated from equation (4). Excluding various
dummy variables
Regressor: Dependent variable: budget share for ...
Food Housing Energy Transport Education
Polynomial coefficient:
y1 0.963*** -0.037 0.360*** 0.486** -1.795***
y2 -0.678** 0.085 -0.294*** -0.577*** 1.793***
y3 0.231* -0.032 0.101** 0.281*** -0.884***
y4 -0.044 0.004 -0.018* -0.069*** 0.231***
y5 0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.008*** -0.030***
y6 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.002***
Household types:
z1 -0.098*** 0.000 -0.014*** -0.022*** 0.049***
z2 -0.094*** -0.036*** 0.006 0.010 -0.032**
z3 -0.053*** 0.011 0.001 -0.003 0.087***
z4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z5 -0.022** -0.082*** 0.003 -0.001 0.022*
z6 -0.001 -0.043*** -0.004 -0.001 0.028**
Interaction term:
yz1 0.017*** 0.010** 0.002 0.006*** -0.004
yz2 0.014*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.008*** 0.034***
yz3 0.010** 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.022***
yz4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
yz5 0.005* 0.013*** -0.001 0.001 0.002
yz6 0.011*** 0.002 0.001 0.006*** -0.007**
Interaction between price and expenditure (bi,j):
ynp1 -0.035*** -0.003** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.015***
ynp2 -0.003** 0.001 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.000
ynp3 0.008*** 0.004*** -0.027*** 0.006*** 0.004***
ynp4 0.013*** 0.003*** 0.006*** -0.028*** 0.006***
ynp5 0.015*** 0.000 0.004*** 0.006*** -0.051***
Price parameter (ai,j,l)
a1,j,l 0.142*** 0.000 -0.024*** -0.051*** -0.050***
a2,j,l 0.000 0.032*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.004
a3,j,l -0.024*** -0.022*** 0.115*** -0.024*** -0.018***
a4,j,l -0.051*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 0.135*** -0.023***
a5,j,l -0.050*** -0.004 -0.018*** -0.023*** 0.146***
constant -0.166 0.168 -0.030 0.097 0.728***
N 23455
R-squared 0.407 0.252 0.489 0.267 0.398
adjusted R2 195
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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